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6. Security Considerations
SecMX is a building block for more secure email; it does not purport to be "the solution".
6. Security Considerations
6.1. What SecMX is not
SecMX:
o Is not about sender authentication. SecMX simply assumes that it
happens (the technology and technique utilised are not important
to SecMX);
o Assumes that the TLS connections are negotiated between the two
parties;
o Assumes both parties are responsible for their own internal
security;
o Assumes that DNS is good enough for now (DNSSEC [RFC4033] is a
future option).
6.2. SecMX and DNS
A DNS hijack could potentially see secure email messages being routed
to spoofed BERs or SORs. If this were deemed to be a serious threat,
upgrading the DNS system to DNSSEC ([RFC4033]) could help to
alleviate this problem.
SecMX -- a better way to send email
The above descriptions clearly show that TLS is the technology you use when you discard all of the hard bits about security and need to solve only the easy bits. Remember it’s easy to assume that Certificate Authorities (or ANY ‘Trusted Third Party’ for that matter) undertake proper due diligence on the certificate applicant - this is a concept that is directly at odds with good security practice.
Any system that allows anonymous users is inherently insecure regardless of what technology is used. Everything in this section clearly shows that SecMX is not and can never be a secure method to deliver emails. Moving to a TLS protocol, as previously mentioned, will not change anything.
Emails from one Government Minister will still end up stolen and found in the hands of another.
The above descriptions clearly show that TLS is the technology you use when you discard all of the hard bits about security and need to solve only the easy bits. Remember it’s easy to assume that Certificate Authorities (or ANY ‘Trusted Third Party’ for that matter) undertake proper due diligence on the certificate applicant - this is a concept that is directly at odds with good security practice.
Any system that allows anonymous users is inherently insecure regardless of what technology is used. Everything in this section clearly shows that SecMX is not and can never be a secure method to deliver emails. Moving to a TLS protocol, as previously mentioned, will not change anything.
I am relieved to see that the State Services Commission recognises SecMX will not work and trust they will NOT take it as a new New Zealand Standard for electronic messaging.